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ELONIS V. UNITED STATES: THE NEED TO UPHOLD INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH WHILE PROTECTING
VICTIMS OF ONLINE TRUE THREATS
ALISON J. BEST ∗
In American society, social networking sites and other online forums
dominate modern communication. As of December 2015, over one billion
people worldwide actively used Facebook on a daily basis. 1 The increased
frequency with which individuals use the Internet as a primary means of
communication has profoundly changed the level of access people have to
posts, updates, and statements made on social media profiles. 2 Because
online communications tend to allow individuals to post their thoughts on a
widely accessible network, courts have seen a rise in “true threat” litigation
over the past decade, which evaluates whether statements communicated by
an individual qualify as threats. 3 Courts have wrestled with several
complex issues regarding Internet communications, and they have
particularly struggled with how to apply federal statutes prohibiting true
threats in ways that do not impermissibly limit the First Amendment right
to free speech. 4 As the Supreme Court has not announced a clear formula
for how to interpret threatening statements on social networking sites,
substantial ambiguity persists regarding what content individuals may post
without risking criminal prosecution. 5

© 2016 Alison J. Best.
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author would like to thank her editors, Haley Peterson, Michael Cianfichi, Lindsay DeFrancesco,
and Laura Merkey for their time and insightful comments throughout the writing process. The
author would also like to thank Professor Leigh Goodmark for her invaluable guidance on this
Note. The author dedicates this Note to her parents, Sharon and Fred, her brother Peter, and her
Welsh Corgi Roger for their unremitting love, support, and encouragement.
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2. See Adrienne Scheffey, Defining Intent in 165 Characters or Less: A Call for Clarity in
the Intent Standard of True Threats After Virginia v. Black, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 861, 867 (2015)
(stating the “prevalence of, and access to, widespread speech is unprecedented worldwide with
millions of users communicating daily through social media”).
3. See id. at 864 (explaining “true threat cases are becoming more prevalent in light of the
expansion of ubiquitous access to the Internet and social media”); see infra Part II.C (explaining
that courts have found communications inciting violence and symbols of intimidation meant to
instill fear of bodily harm to constitute true threats).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part IV.
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In Elonis v. United States, 6 the Supreme Court had the chance to
address this increasingly relevant issue in deciding whether an individual’s
Facebook posts qualified as true threats. 7 The Supreme Court erred by
failing to concretely define the application of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c),8
which prohibits the communication of true threats to speech transmitted
through online social networking. 9 The Court should have considered both
the First Amendment implications and the question of which intent standard
to apply when considering online posts as threats as one single issue.
Because the Court chose, unfortunately, to separate these issues, it missed a
vital opportunity to announce the proper intent standard under 18 U.S.C.
Section 875(c). 10 The lack of a concrete standard will lead to continued
confusion both in lower courts and to individuals active in social media. 11
The Court should have adopted a hybrid reasonable-speaker and
reasonable-recipient standard, which would best balance the dual interests
of maintaining individual free speech rights while also protecting the public
from true threats. 12
I. THE CASE
In September 2013, Anthony Douglas Elonis was found guilty of
violating 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c), 13 which makes it a crime to
communicate a “true threat” to injure another person.14 The charges alleged
that Elonis had issued true threats over social media to his former coworkers, law enforcement officers, an FBI agent, his ex-wife, and
elementary school children. 15 Elonis regularly used Facebook to publicly
air his grievances to his “friends” on the site.16 In May 2010, Elonis’s wife
and two children left him after almost seven years of marriage. 17 After his
6. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
7. Id. at 2004.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
9. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part IV.C.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. United States v. Elonis, No. 11-13, 2011 WL 5024284 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2011). Section
875(c) states that “[w]hoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
14. Id. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania posited that “[a] statement
is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context or under such
circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted
by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intent to
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.” Brief for Petitioner at 17, Elonis v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).
15. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 324.
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family left him, Elonis started listening to violent rap music and eventually
began to post lyrics of his own on his Facebook page. 18 He posted these
lyrics under his rap name and musical persona, “Tone Dougie.” 19 Elonis’s
violent lyrics were often accompanied by reminders that they were not
intended to reflect actual people. 20 He wrote that the posts allowed him to
express himself and to move on from the pain caused by losing his family. 21
Elonis’s coworkers, employers, and ex-wife, however, considered Elonis’s
Facebook activity dangerous and threatening. 22
The first post to warrant concern occurred after Elonis attended a
Halloween event at the amusement park where he worked. 23 Elonis posted
a photo of himself and a coworker in which he held a knife to her throat. 24
Elonis captioned the photo “I Wish.”25 After viewing the photo on Elonis’s
Facebook account, the Chief of Park Security fired him. 26 Elonis
subsequently posted a detailed response on his Facebook page, stating that
he still had access to park facility keys. 27 He wrote “Y’all think it’s too
dark and foggy to secure your facility from a man as mad as me. . . .
Whoever thought the Halloween Haunt could be so f***ing scary?” 28
Following this post, Elonis was indicted for threatening park employees and
customers. 29
In addition to Elonis’s Facebook posts regarding his former job, he
routinely posted explicit material targeting his ex-wife. 30 Elonis’s ex-wife
viewed these posts and sought a Protection From Abuse order, which a state
court granted. 31 In one particular post, Elonis wrote that it would be illegal
for him to say that someone should kill his ex-wife, but nevertheless legal
for him to explain that illegality. 32 He also stated that it would be illegal for
him to say someone should kill his ex-wife with a mortar launcher.33 Elonis
followed the post with a diagram and detailed directions about the best
18. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 6–7.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324. Elonis’s wife testified that Elonis had never listened to rap
music or expressed any desire to write his own lyrics at any point during their marriage. Id. at
325.
23. Id. at 324.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 326.
30. Id. at 324–26.
31. Id. at 324.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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place someone could fire the launcher into his wife’s home. 34 The post was
based on a stand-up comedy routine, and Elonis provided a link to the
original skit, accompanied by a statement that he was “willing to go to jail
for [his] constitutional rights.” 35 Shortly after his ex-wife obtained the
Protection From Abuse order, Elonis wrote another violent post from his
Tone Dougie account.36 The post referred to the order, asking, “[i]s it thick
enough to stop a bullet?” 37 He also mentioned having “enough explosives
to take care of the state police and the sheriff’s department,” which
prompted the third count of Elonis’s indictment for threatening law
enforcement officers. 38
In addition to posting lyrics directed towards his ex-wife and the local
police department, Elonis used his Tone Dougie page to write that there
were “[e]nough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most
heinous school shooting ever imagined.” 39 This post prompted the FBI to
monitor Elonis’s online activity more closely. 40 When agents encountered
more posts alluding to school shootings, they visited Elonis at his home. 41
Immediately following the in-person visit, Elonis posted original lyrics
entitled “Little Agent Lady.” 42 The lyrics contained graphic descriptions
about wanting to slit one of the agent’s throats and “[l]eave her bleedin’
from her jugular in the arms of her partner.” 43 Elonis referenced plans to
strap himself with a bomb and detonate the explosives if police placed him
under arrest. 44 He wrote, “I’m just a crazy sociopath . . . . I’m gonna be
famous [c]ause I’m just an aspiring rapper who likes the attention who
happens to be under investigation for terrorism.” 45
Facebook posts related to Elonis’s ex-wife, the local police station, the
FBI agent, and local elementary schools provided the basis of an indictment
against Elonis for making threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). 46
Section 875(c) makes it a crime to communicate true threats in interstate
commerce. 47 Elonis moved to dismiss the indictment in the District Court
34. Id. at 324–25.
35. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 12. The routine involved a satirical approach by
comedian Trevor Moore to explain the illegality of threatening to kill the president. Id. at 10.
36. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324.
37. Id. at 325.
38. Id. at 326.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 14.
43. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326.
44. Id.
45. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 15–16.
46. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) states that “whoever transmits in interstate or foreign
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure
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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing that it failed to accuse him
of intending to threaten anyone. 48 The district court denied this motion and
upheld the Third Circuit precedent interpreting 18 U.S.C. Section 875 as
not requiring a finding that Elonis intended to threaten anyone, but only
requiring a finding that he made the communication. 49 Elonis later
requested a jury instruction that would have required the government to
show that Elonis subjectively intended his posts as real threats. 50 The
district court denied the request, and instead defined a true threat as a
statement made intentionally by the defendant “wherein a reasonable person
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention
to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.”51 The jury found
Elonis guilty on four out of five counts of the indictment, and he was
sentenced to three years and eight months in jail and three years of
supervised release. 52
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
Elonis again challenged the jury instructions provided by the district
court. 53 He stressed that the jury should have been required to find that he
intended his online posts as true threats.54 The Third Circuit rejected this
argument and declined to apply a subjective intent standard.55 Instead, it
reiterated that the proper standard for intent under 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c)
is that the defendant made the communication intentionally, and that a
reasonable person would interpret the statement as a threat. 56 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the proper intent standard for a threat
under 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). 57

the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.”
48. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327.
49. Id. The Court applied a “general intent” standard, in which a statement would qualify as
a true threat if a reasonable person would have understood the communication as a threat. Id.
Rather than considering whether Elonis subjectively intended his posts to be interpreted as threats,
the general intent standard applied by the district court only considers culpability from an
objective perspective. Id.
50. Id. at 327.
51. Id. The government provided as witnesses several of the individuals mentioned in
Elonis’s posts, including his ex-wife, all of whom testified that they considered Elonis’s posts
threats. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 17–18. Elonis argued, unsuccessfully, that his
lyrics resembled those of many other popular rappers, and helped him cope with the instability in
his life. Id. at 6–7.
52. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 327–28.
57. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 875 governs the class of statements that do not enjoy First
Amendment protections because they constitute true threats.58 The statute
provides that “whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to
injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.” 59 Historically, the Supreme Court has
treated true threats as a category of speech unprotected by the First
Amendment. 60 When analyzing statutory provisions that reference true
threats, however, the Court has applied varying intent standards to the
crimes, without referencing the First Amendment implications of these
statements. 61 Parts II.A–B will address how the Supreme Court has
analyzed criminal statutes that fail to delineate a requisite mental state, and
how the Court has traditionally held that criminal law requires some level
of intent. 62 Part II.C will then explore recent, major developments to the
true threat doctrine by examining Supreme Court precedent.63 Finally, Part
II.D will address the circuit split regarding the proper intent requirement to
apply 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c) and will consider what statements have
qualified as true threats in the circuits. 64
A. The Omission of an Intent Requirement in a Criminal Statute Does
Not Automatically Render the Prohibited Behavior a General Intent
Crime
One hallmark feature separating criminal law from other types of
misconduct is the requirement that the defendant acted with a level of intent
when committing the unlawful act.65 Statutes typically require either a
“general intent” or a “specific intent” standard.66 In the context of true
threats, a general, or objective intent requirement means a statement would
qualify as a true threat if a reasonable person would have understood the
communication as a threat.67 A specific or subjective intent standard would
consider whether the speaker subjectively intended her posts to be

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
Id.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.A–B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952).
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.D.
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interpreted as threats and would require more than an objective showing of
intent. 68
In Morissette v. United States, 69 the United States Supreme Court
assessed how to interpret criminal statutes lacking an explicit intent
standard. It held that a court should presume the statute requires some
mental element, even if Congress did not include one.70 The defendant in
Morissette came across a government-owned bombing test site where he
found several shells he believed to be abandoned.71 Unaware that the
government owned the property, the defendant removed several shells from
the field and took them to a nearby metal processing plant to exchange the
metal for cash. 72 The defendant was subsequently charged under 18
U.S.C. Section 641, which states: “whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or
knowingly converts government property is punishable by fine and
imprisonment.” 73
Because the statute itself did not specify what level of intent must be
proven, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied a general intent
standard, and held that the word “knowingly” only applied to the fact that
the defendant knew he was removing the shells from the field. 74 The
Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s application of a
general intent standard to Section 641, and focused its analysis of the
importance of intent in criminal law. 75 Ultimately, the Morissette Court
ruled that “[t]he contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention . . . is as universal and persistent in mature systems of
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” 76

68. See United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1992), abrogated by United
States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining the “difference between a specific
intent and general intent crime involves the way in which the intent is proved—whether by
probing the defendant’s subjective state of mind or whether by objectively looking at the
defendant’s behavior in the totality of the circumstances” (citing United States v. Hoffman, 806
F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986))).
69. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
70. Id. at 263 (holding that “mere omission . . . of any mention of intent will not be construed
as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced”).
71. Id. at 247.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012) (emphasis added)).
74. Id. at 249–50. The Court of Appeals framed the issue as a question of whether the
government only had to prove that Mr. Morissette intended to remove the property from the field,
or whether the government had to prove he possessed a “felonious intent” to remove the
government’s property. Id. at 249.
75. Id. at 260–61. By tracing the history of larceny and other theft offenses throughout the
common law, the Supreme Court highlighted the engrained practice of applying a mens rea in
order to convict a person for those crimes, even though the statute failed to explicitly state an
intent requirement. Id.
76. Id. at 250.
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The fundamental difference between criminal and civil charges, the
Supreme Court reasoned, rests on whether a person has a guilty mind when
committing the offense. 77 Based on this long-established principle, the
Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s reasoning that the lack of an
explicit intent requirement within the statute required them to apply a
general intent standard.78 The Morissette Court held that a general intent
standard in this case was insufficient to ensure that a defendant had
consciously violated the law, and therefore a subjective requirement was
required. 79 Although the statute itself failed to announce an explicit level of
intent, the Court interpreted the statute as requiring subjective intent, and
thereby reversed Morissette’s conviction. 80
B. If a Particular Reading of a Statute Would Criminalize Innocent
Behavior, the Court Should Infer That Congress Intended the
Statute to Require an Element of Subjective Intent
In Staples v. United States, 81 the Supreme Court built on Morissette’s
principle that criminal statutes lacking an explicit intent standard should be
interpreted as requiring subjective intent.82 In Staples, the defendant faced
charges under the National Firearms Act, which prohibits possessing a
machine gun unless that person has properly registered it with the federal
government. 83 The charges arose from an incident in which the police
searched the defendant’s home and found a weapon they suspected had
been modified to have automatic firing capability. 84 Admitting that he had
not properly registered the weapon, the defendant nonetheless argued he
was unaware that the weapon had automatic firing capabilities and that he
had never used it in that capacity. 85 Because he did not know about the
weapon’s modification and had not registered it with the federal
government, the defendant pled not guilty. 86
The Supreme Court began its analysis of Staples by once again turning
to case precedent showing that statutes without a mens rea requirement are
largely disfavored. 87 To accept the government’s argument that this statute
77. Id.
78. Id. at 276.
79. Id. at 271, 273–76.
80. Id. at 276.
81. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 602. The National Firearms Act also failed to delineate an explicit intent
requirement. Id.
84. Id. at 603.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 604–05 (citing Liparota v. United States, 71 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)); see also United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251, 254 (1922) (holding that criminal statutes typically require
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only required general intent, the Court held that it would need evidence of
Congress’ intent not to require an express mental state.88 To discern
whether Congress truly intended a statute to have no intent requirement, the
Court further held that it must examine the nature of the subject matter
being regulated. 89 The Court reasoned that when a statute regulates an
extremely dangerous activity, or one that places the public in danger, it can
assume that Congress “intended to place the burden on the defendant to
‘ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes within the inhibition of
the statute.’” 90 The Court further reasoned that although society has a
strong interest in the proper regulation of firearms, and that possession of
automatic weapons qualifies as dangerous conduct, the defendant could not
face charges because he did not know his actions violated the law.91 By
holding that this statute implicitly required subjective intent, the Court
expressed the importance of assuring that defendants facing criminal
charges clearly intended to cause the harm the statute sought to prevent.92
The Court’s decisions in Staples and Morissette emphasized the
importance of separating innocent conduct from criminal behavior when
evaluating statutes that are silent on intent. 93 The Court reinforced this
argument when it overturned a defendant’s conviction for fraudulent food
stamp use in Liparota v. United States. 94 At trial, Mr. Liparota requested a
some level of subjective intent because there is a strong interest in ensuring that individuals will
not be punished for truly innocent behavior).
88. Staples, 511 U.S. at 606. A general intent standard would not require the government to
prove that the defendant had knowledge of his weapon’s automatic firing capabilities. Instead, it
would only be required to show that the defendant knowingly possessed the gun. Id.
89. Id. at 619 (holding that determining whether a statute requires general or specific intent
“depends upon a commonsense evaluation of the nature of the particular device or substance
Congress has subjected to regulation and the expectations that individuals may legitimately have
in dealing with the regulated items”); see also Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 (holding that statutes which
regulate very dangerous materials may omit a subjective intent element, even if they impose
stringent criminal punishments). The Court also found that, in certain areas of regulation, when
the public welfare is at risk and Congress has clearly indicated its commitment to protecting
society’s interests over protecting those individuals whose innocent behavior might subject them
to criminal punishments under the statute, the statute may be read as requiring only a showing of
general intent. Id.
90. Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 (quoting Balint, 258 U.S. at 254) (alteration in original).
91. Id. at 611.
92. Id. at 619–20 (holding that “the usual presumption that a defendant must know the facts
that make his conduct illegal should apply”).
93. Id. Throughout its analysis, the Court emphasized that it typically interprets statutes as
requiring some element of subjective intent unless the statute regulates a highly dangerous
activity. This analysis reflects the principle that criminal conduct requires punishment, whereas
innocent conduct does not. Id.
94. 471 U.S. 419 (1985). The defendant purchased food stamps from an undercover
government agent, and was charged under the Food Stamp Fraud Statute, which punishes a person
“wh[o] knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in
any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations.” Id. at 420–22 (quoting 7 U.S.C. §
2024(b)(1) (second alteration in original)).
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jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he “knowingly did
an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law.” 95 The
district court, however, had determined that the government only needed to
show that the defendant acquired food stamps in a manner not authorized
by the statute, and therefore his mental state did not affect whether his
behavior qualified as criminal.96
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Liparota argued, and the Court
accepted, that the statute had to contain an implicit mens rea requirement
because otherwise it would “criminalize a broad range of apparently
innocent conduct.” 97 Specifically, the unclear instructions provided by the
statute on how to legally obtain food stamps created opportunities for
individuals to mistakenly violate the law by obtaining stamps from
unauthorized sources. 98 Because of this confusing structure, the Court
found that the statute too often resulted in criminalization of innocent
conduct. 99 The Liparota Court held that the government did not have to
prove that the defendant had knowledge of the specific rules governing the
purchase of food stamps, but it did have to prove that the defendant knew
his conduct was wrong. 100 Because the government failed to demonstrate
that the defendant knew his method of purchasing food stamps violated the
law, the Supreme Court overturned Mr. Liparota’s conviction. 101 In so
doing, the Court reinforced the principle that it may interpret a statute as
requiring subjective intent, even if Congress has not named an explicit
intent standard. 102
C. Both Congress and the Courts Have Failed to Express a Clear
Intent Requirement for the Communication of True Threats
The Supreme Court affords broad protections to speech under the First
Amendment, 103 in order for a communication to fall outside First
Amendment protection, the speech must constitute a true threat.104
Categories of speech which the Court has previously held to constitute true
95. Id. at 422.
96. Id. at 422–23.
97. Id. at 426.
98. Id. at 426–27.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 434 (arguing that this proof may be established “by reference to facts and
circumstances surrounding the case that petitioner knew that his conduct was unauthorized or
illegal”).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 426.
103. See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (holding that mere advocacy of the use of force
or violence qualifies as speech protected by the First Amendment).
104. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (holding that states may constitutionally restrict speech that
represents an intention to cause bodily harm to a group or individual because those statements
constitute true threats).
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threats include speech inciting violence105 and symbols of intimidation
intentionally meant to instill fear.106 Communications that merely express
unpopular or offensive viewpoints do not constitute true threats.107
The United States Supreme Court first used the term “true threats” in
Watts v. United States, 108 when it evaluated whether the defendant’s
statements at a public, anti-war rally violated a federal statute prohibiting a
person from “knowingly and willfully making any threat to take the life or
to inflict bodily harm upon the president of the United States.” 109 In
holding that the defendant’s statements did not constitute true threats, the
Supreme Court stressed the importance of protecting political speech, even
though it can often be “vituperative, abusive, and inexact.” 110 The Court’s
decision in Watts exemplifies the Court’s commitment to protecting First
Amendment rights, particularly with regard to speech that could be
interpreted as unpopular.111 The Watts Court set a high bar for making a
successful claim for a true threat.
The Supreme Court continued to analyze threatening speech on very
narrow grounds in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 112 a case in which the petitioner
spoke at a Ku Klux Klan rally and encouraged members to participate in
upcoming marches and demonstrations.113 He also appeared in a film clip
dressed in a Ku Klux Klan hood and expressed his frustrations that political
and governmental leaders of the country were “suppress[ing] the white,
Caucasian race” and that “there might have to be some revengeance[sic]
taken.” 114 The petitioner was convicted under Ohio’s Syndicalism statute,
which made it a crime to “advocat[e] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of
crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform.” 115

105. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
106. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
107. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49.
108. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
109. Id. at 705 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2012) (alteration in original)). The defendant’s
charges arose out of his statements at an anti-Vietnam war rally in which he was overheard saying
“I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J.” Id. at 706.
110. Id. at 708. The Court emphasized that the offensive nature of political speech cannot on
its own be a basis for censorship, but did not express a concrete standard under which to evaluate
these classes of statements. Id.
111. Id. at 707 (holding that statutes which criminalize speech “must be interpreted with the
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind” because public debate is foundational to our
society).
112. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
113. Id. at 445.
114. Id. at 446.
115. Id. at 444–45 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13 (alteration in original)).
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The Supreme Court held that the Ohio statute violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments because it punished “mere advocacy,” and because
it made it a crime to assemble and advocate constitutionally protected
views. 116 It posited that, while the petitioner’s statements at the Ku Klux
Klan rally promoted troublesome, white supremacist views, they did not
actually incite any violence. 117 The Court stressed that in order for
statements of this class to fall outside the protection of the First
Amendment, the petitioner’s speech would have had to amount to
incitement. 118 Although actual violence need not occur for a statement to
qualify as incitement, the violence communicated must be imminently
likely to occur. 119 The Court’s reasoning in Brandenburg again reinforced
that only a small category of truly threatening statements will be held to
violate the First Amendment, and statutes that criminalize the advocacy of
offensive beliefs will likely violate the Constitution. 120
Similarly, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,121 the Supreme
Court struck down a city ordinance that prohibited burning crosses by
making it illegal to display any symbols that “arous[e] anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.” 122 Because this statute criminalized the expression of personal
views, the Court found it unconstitutional on its face. 123 Although the
R.A.V. Court explained that true threats do not enjoy free speech protection
because their censorship “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that
threatened violence will occur,” it held that the defendant’s cross burning
did not rise to the level of a true threat.124 The Court emphasized, as it had
in Watts and Brandenburg, that the offensive nature of a certain behavior or
communication cannot, on its own, serve as the basis for censorship. 125

116. Id. at 449.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 447–48. The Court announced a two-part test for determining whether speech
qualified as incitement, which required that both the communication be aimed at producing
imminent lawless conduct, and that the lawless conduct be likely to occur as a result of the
communication. Id.
119. Id. at 449.
120. Id.
121. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
122. Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
123. Id. at 381.
124. Id. at 388 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)). The Court did not
elaborate on, nor provide a rule regarding at which point the defendant’s behavior would
constitute a true threat, however.
125. Id. at 382 (citing, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–11 (1940); then citing
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
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In Virginia v. Black, 126 the Supreme Court addressed another state
statute that made cross burning illegal, and clarified the current standard
under which a practice might constitute a true threat.127 The Court held that
while statutes may criminalize efforts to intimidate or instill fear in another
person, displaying an offensive symbol used historically for intimidation
does not in itself constitute a true threat. 128 In contrast with the St. Paul
City ordinance in R.A.V., which criminalized all acts of cross burning, the
Virginia statute at issue in this case defined the illegal behavior as cross
burning with “an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” 129 At
trial, the judge instructed the jury that the act of burning a cross constituted
prima facie evidence of an “intent to intimidate,” and so the defendant
could be found guilty as long as the jury concluded that the defendant
burned a cross. 130 The Supreme Court held that while a state may enact a
statute that bans cross burning, this particular statute was over-broad, and
therefore violated the First Amendment. 131
In holding that the Virginia statute violated the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court affirmed that an act of intimidation must amount to a true
threat in order to constitute a crime. 132 In the context of this particular
statute, the Court announced that “‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.” 133 The Supreme Court had never applied an element
of subjective intent to its definition of true threats prior to this case. 134
However, the Court stressed that states may ban intimidating behavior, as
long as those statutes do not criminalize innocent behavior on the grounds
that many individuals find that behavior offensive. 135 Because the act of
burning crosses does not always imply “an intent to intimidate,” the Court
held that the statute violated the First Amendment because it posed a risk of
126. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
127. Id. at 347–48.
128. Id. at 363.
129. Id. at 362–63.
130. Id. at 350–51. The jury instruction read that the “burning of a cross by itself is sufficient
evidence from which you may infer the required intent.” Id.
131. Id. at 348, 364 (holding that the prima facie evidence provision rendered the statute
impermissible under the First Amendment because it removed any element of mens rea from the
criminal act, and because burning crosses does not always carry with it an intent to intimidate
particular people).
132. Id. at 359.
133. Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)).
134. See, e.g., id. at 359–60 (holding that a defendant need not intend to carry out the threat in
order to be convicted for communicating a true threat).
135. Id. at 358 (noting that the First Amendment does not allow a state the “power to prohibit
dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens
believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring))).

1140

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:1127

imposing criminal penalties on those whose conduct did not actually fall
under the statute. 136
D. The Court’s Use of a Subjective Intent Component in Its Definition
of a True Threat in Virginia v. Black Has Led to a Circuit Split
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, the
definition of a true threat had never included an express reference to a
subjective intent standard. 137 Because Supreme Court precedent regarding
true threats has focused on a wide variety of issues, ranging from statements
made in public debates to traditionally intimidating behavior, little direction
exists for courts to determine the proper intent requirement to apply to true
threats. 138 Due to the lack of clear Supreme Court decisions regarding this
issue, the circuits are split on whether to apply an objective, a subjective, or
a combination of both objective and subjective standards of intent to true
threat cases.139
1.

The Majority of Circuits Apply an Objective, ReasonableRecipient Standard When Evaluating Criminal Intent in a True
Threat Statute

As statutes criminalizing true threats typically do not contain explicit
intent requirements, many circuits have relied on the presumption that such
statutes only require general intent. 140 The circuits that apply general intent
requirements to true threats use a reasonable person standard in evaluating
whether a communication constitutes a true threat.141 For example, in
United States v. DeAndino, 142 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the proper standard from which to evaluate a
communication as a threat is by an objective, general intent standard. The
court framed this inquiry by asking whether “a reasonable person would

136. Id. at 365–66.
137. Id. at 359.
138. See supra Part II.C–D.
139. See supra Part II.C.
140. See United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that a “general
rule of construction of criminal statutes [is] that where a statute does not specify a heightened
mental element such as specific intent, general intent is presumed to be the required element”
(citing United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 178–79 (5th Cir. 1989); then citing United States v.
Nelson, 733 F.2d 364, 370–71 (5th Cir. 1984); and citing United States v. Barber, 594 F.2d 1242,
1244 (9th Cir. 1979))).
141. See United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that true threats
should be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person viewing the communication).
142. Id. This case has since been abrogated by United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663 (6th
Cir. 2015), which was decided after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Elonis v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), and therefore was prohibited from applying a purely objective
intent standard.
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consider the statement to be a threat.”143 The Sixth Circuit rejected the
defendant’s argument that general intent statutes heighten the risk that
individuals might be punished for innocent deeds. Instead, the court
reasoned that a defendant could present a defense that her acts constituted
innocent deeds regardless of whether she was being charged for a general or
a specific intent crime. 144 The Sixth Circuit held that, based on the plain
language of the statute which did not mention any specific intent
requirement, the statute must be read as a general intent crime. 145 This
argument mirrors those adopted by other circuits relying on an objective
standard of intent for true threats.146
2. Some Courts Apply an Objective Reasonable-Speaker Standard
The First Circuit favors an objective, reasonable-speaker standard as
opposed to an objective, reasonable-recipient standard because the
reasonable-speaker standard provides protection against juries basing their
decisions on sympathy. 147 In United States v. Fulmer, 148 the First Circuit
upheld jury instructions defining the intent requirement as such that “a
reasonable person would foresee that the statement would convey to the
recipient a seriousness of purpose and the apparent prospect of
execution.” 149 The court found that the proper intent standard for true
threats must contain some element of the defendant’s own intentions for his
or her actions, but that a purely subjective standard would be too difficult
for a prosecutor to prove. 150 The court reasoned that if a jury could find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the speaker should have foreseen his words
as a threat, the conviction would stand.151 It explained that the jury could
base its conclusion on all the circumstances surrounding the

143. DeAndino, 958 F.2d at 147–48. The defendant in this case was charged with violating 18
U.S.C. § 875(c), after stating to a man that he was going to “blow his brains out” and that the man
was “going to die.” Id. at 147. The district court applied a specific intent requirement, holding
that in order to convict the defendant, the jury had to find that “the defendant knowingly and
willfully threatened or intended to threaten” the victim. Id. The district court based its reasoning
on the holding of Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) in which the Court held
that statutes that do not delineate a mens rea requirement should be presumed not to be strict
liability statutes. Id. at 148.
144. Id. at 149.
145. Id.
146. See e.g., United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that true
threats communicated over the Internet should be interpreted based on whether a reasonable
recipient under the circumstances would have considered the statement a threat).
147. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997).
148. Id. at 1486.
149. Id. at 1493.
150. Id. at 1494 (holding that “there is no way directly to scrutinize the works of someone
else’s mind or his state of mind”).
151. Id. at 1493–94.
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communication, such as the tone of voice of the speaker, the speaker’s
normal demeanor, and the speaker and recipient’s relationship. 152
3. A Minority of Courts Have Applied a Hybrid Intent Standard
That Includes Both Subjective and Objective Elements
For some courts, neither a completely objective nor a completely
subjective intent requirement suffices, and the government must show
elements of both in order to support a conviction for issuing a true threat.153
For example, in United States v. Bagdasarian, 154 the Ninth Circuit adopted
the reasoning that criminal statutes require a mens rea element in order to
separate innocent behavior from criminal conduct.155 Therefore, a speaker
has to demonstrate his or her intent to intimidate or threaten a person, or
group of persons, both subjectively and objectively. 156 The Ninth Circuit
held that criminal statutes must require a fact-finder to objectively “look at
the entire factual context of [the] statements including the surrounding
events, the listeners’ reaction, and whether the words are conditional.” 157
Because Bagdasarian’s statements failed to constitute true threats under
both an objective and a subjective intent standard, the court reversed his
conviction. 158
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Elonis v. United States, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and held that 18
U.S.C. Section 875(c) requires a higher mens rea requirement than general
intent. 159 The Court first examined the plain language of Section 875(c),
concluding that the statute did not announce a particular intent
requirement.160 It then relied on the presumption that criminal statutes
require a mens rea element, and ultimately decided that a purely objective

152. Id.
153. See United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that true
threats require both an element of subjective and of objective intent).
154. 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011).
155. Id. at 1116–18.
156. Id. at 1116 (holding that a state can only punish a threat “if the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359
(2003))).
157. Id. at 1119 (quoting United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992)).
158. Id. at 1117. The alleged true threats in this case were the defendant’s racially-charged,
violent posts about President Obama to an online message board, which included links to videos
of explosions and emails to friends with links to ads for various firearms. Id. at 1115–16.
159. 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015).
160. Id.
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standard for true threats could not stand. 161 The Elonis Court chose not to
consider any First Amendment issues, and rejected the argument that its
failure to announce a concrete intent standard for true threats would
perpetuate the circuit split. 162 Both the concurring and dissenting opinions
criticized the majority for its failure to clarify the requisite intent standard
for Section 875(c), and rejected the holding that true threats require a
showing of subjective intent. 163
The Court began its analysis by evaluating the text of Section 875(c),
which states that a person who “transmits in interstate or foreign commerce
any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat
to injure the person of another shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.” 164 The Court noted that neither the
government nor Elonis presented a concrete mens rea argument under
Section 875(c), particularly because the statute itself does not reference
intent. 165
The Court, relying on precedent, reasoned that although a statute fails
to mention the specific level of criminal intent necessary for a conviction, a
requisite level of intent may nevertheless exist.166 The Court found that if a
statute does not include a standard of intent, it should interpret the statute to
require “only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful
conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”167 In the context of Facebook
communications, the Court explained that posting offensive or violent
material does not automatically qualify those statements as true threats.168
A person may write violent posts that a court could interpret as innocent
conduct. 169 In evaluating whether Elonis’s statements crossed over into
wrongful conduct, the Court determined it would focus on the mental state
Elonis had at the time he made the Facebook posts.170

161. Id. at 2011.
162. Id. at 2012–13.
163. Id. at 2013.
164. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). The Court, however, failed to articulate the
standard.
165. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008–09.
166. Id.; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952) (holding that the
defendant, who took shell casings from a government military test range under the impression
they were abandoned property, could not be found guilty for “knowingly convert[ing]”
government property unless he had actual knowledge that the government owned the casings);
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (holding that the Court may not interpret a
statute that is silent as to the requisite mental state in a way that would criminalize a “broad range
of apparently innocent conduct”).
167. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
168. Id. at 2011.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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By framing the issue this way, the Court rejected the government’s
argument that because Elonis consciously posted his statements and a
reasonable person would have considered the posts true threats, Elonis
acted with sufficient criminal intent under Section 875(c). 171 The Court
found that the government’s approach, which read a negligence standard
into the statute, does not give rise to criminal liability. 172 Because most
federal criminal statutes expressly mention an intent requirement, the Court
held Section 875(c) not to be different. 173 The Court stressed the
importance of intent standards in criminal law, particularly because of the
concern that a negligence standard might lead to punishing individuals for
innocent activity. 174 Therefore, the Court held that Elonis could not be
convicted merely because a reasonable person would have interpreted his
Facebook posts as threats. 175 A jury would have had to find that Elonis
consciously engaged in wrongdoing, which could be established if he
possessed a requisite mental state higher than negligence. 176 Though the
Court found that something more than general intent was required to
impose criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c), it did not specify
the details of such a standard. 177 Because the jury only addressed the issue
from a negligence standard, the Court held that Elonis’s conviction could
not stand. 178 The Court reversed the decision of the Third Circuit, and
remanded the case so that a jury could consider the facts in light of the
higher intent standard for Section 875(c).179
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito agreed with the majority that
Section 875(c) required a mental state higher than negligence, but criticized
the Court for failing to concretely establish the appropriate standard. 180
Justice Alito expressed his concern that the failure to declare the proper
intent standard would lead to confusion in the lower courts as they would
likely encounter this issue again. 181 Justice Alito wrote that the Court
granted certiorari in order to resolve a circuit split regarding the requisite

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2012.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2013.
178. Id. at 2012. The Court held that a negligence standard was not sufficient to support a
conviction under Section 875(c), and also rejected the arguments of Justice Alito and Justice
Thomas that the Court should have considered whether recklessness could serve as the proper
intent standard. Because no courts of appeals had addressed the recklessness standard, the Elonis
Court chose not to explore it. Id. at 2103.
179. Id. at 2013.
180. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181. Id. at 2014.
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mental state for Section 875(c), and failed to do so. 182 Further, Justice Alito
argued that the proper intent standard for Section 875(c) should be whether
a person recklessly “disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware,” and
that the majority should have announced that standard. 183 He agreed with
the majority’s decision to apply the presumption that federal criminal
statutes typically require some degree of intent. 184 Justice Alito argued that
recklessness properly addresses the need for a higher intent requirement
than negligence in a criminal statute.185 Furthermore, because Congress was
silent as to what standard Section 875 requires, Justice Alito believed the
Court should only apply a slightly higher requirement.186
Additionally, Justice Alito reasoned that the Court should have
addressed the First Amendment issue raised by Elonis. 187 Elonis argued
that an intent standard as low as recklessness would violate the First
Amendment—a claim which Justice Alito strongly rejected. 188 Elonis
claimed that his constitutional right to free speech should have protected
him from prosecution because he did not consider his Facebook statements
threats. 189 He argued that his writing afforded him therapeutic benefits and
helped him recover emotionally from the dissolution of his marriage. 190
Justice Alito, in contrast, argued that the Constitution does not, and never
has, afforded protection for threats.191 Regardless of the alleged benefit
Elonis received from expressing himself through his posts, Justice Alito
reasoned that the context behind the posts and their detailed nature
indicated that Elonis acted recklessly, and caused significant psychological
harm to the targets of his statements.192 Because Justice Alito believed that
the statements, when viewed from a recklessness standard, constituted true
threats, he rejected the argument that the First Amendment protected
Elonis. 193
Voicing similar concerns on the majority’s failure to resolve the circuit
split on Section 875(c)’s appropriate mens rea requirement, Justice Thomas
dissented from the judgment. 194 Instead of advocating for a recklessness
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2015 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
184. Id. at 2014.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2015.
187. Id. at 2016.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003); then citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); and then citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08
(1969)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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standard like Justice Alito, however, Justice Thomas argued the Court of
Appeals had not erred by applying a general intent standard.195 Justice
Thomas agreed with the majority and Justice Alito that criminal statutes
typically include some requisite mental state, but argued that statutes
concerning speech have historically adopted objective, general intent
standards. 196 Justice Thomas argued that a general intent standard
adequately permits an individual to understand whether his conduct
constitutes wrongdoing. 197 Justice Thomas stressed that even if Elonis did
not intend his posts as threats, the fact that they contained violent scenarios
indicated that Elonis acted with sufficient criminal intent. 198 Justice
Thomas rejected the majority’s view that a general intent standard in this
case would amount to mere negligence.199 Justice Thomas framed his
interpretation as a factual analysis, rather than focusing on the mental state
possessed by an individual at the time a threat is made. 200 Justice Thomas
reasoned that the Court should only consider whether the words
communicated by the defendant fell under the legal definition of a threat,
and therefore he believed the Court of Appeals had correctly applied a
general intent standard.201
Justice Thomas also briefly addressed the First Amendment issue
raised by Justice Alito, and largely agreed with him. 202 Through an
historical analysis of Supreme Court precedent, Justice Thomas stressed
that the Court has never allowed threats to enjoy any constitutional
protection. 203 He also argued that the importance of protecting victims
from threats supersedes the danger that innocent conduct may be punished
should the Court choose not to adopt a higher standard of intent. 204 Given
that Justice Thomas did not believe the First Amendment protected Elonis’s
statements and he agreed with the Court of Appeals decision to apply a
general intent standard to Section 875(c), Justice Thomas argued the Court
should have affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit.205

195. Id.
196. Id. at 2019 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; then quoting United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d
1059, 1066 (C.A.4 1994); then citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); and then
quoting United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (C.A.6 2012)).
197. Id. at 2021.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2023.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2013.
202. Id. at 2024.
203. Id. at 2027 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); then citing Chantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and then citing State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754 (1941)).
204. Id. at 2028.
205. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court erred in Elonis v. United States by failing to
concretely define the intent requirement of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c) to
include speech transmitted through online social networking. 206 The Court
should have treated the two issues—whether Elonis’s Facebook posts
violated the First Amendment and which intent standard to apply to alleged
true threats—as one intertwined issue.207 Because the Court chose to
separate these issues, it missed a vital opportunity to resolve the circuit split
regarding the proper intent standard for Section 875(c). 208 To determine the
proper intent standard under the true threat doctrine, the Court should have
considered what standard would ensure that innocent speakers will not face
punishment, while still providing adequate protection to victims and
recipients of true threats.209 The Court could have achieved this balance by
adopting a hybrid standard, combining the reasonable-speaker and
reasonable-recipient tests, which would protect the right to free speech
while allowing for criminal punishment of individuals whose statements fall
outside the protections of the First Amendment. 210 Part IV.A of this Note
will address the intersection of the true threat doctrine’s development under
the First Amendment under the presumption that criminal statutes require
mens rea.
A. While The Court Affords Broad Protections for Unpopular and
Offensive Speech Under the First Amendment, Elonis’s Statements
Rose to the Level of True Threats
The Supreme Court has historically required a high burden in order to
show that statements or behaviors constitute true threats. 211 It has
repeatedly held that communications may not be censored simply because
they are offensive or express unpopular beliefs. 212 However, in the context
of Elonis’s Internet threats, the statements caused extreme harm to the
recipients, and therefore constituted true threats punishable under 18 U.S.C.
Section 875(c). 213 Although the Supreme Court did not deem Elonis’s
statements true threats, they should have because Elonis’s posts did not
constitute justifiable political speech under Watts, and they amounted to
threats of intimidation under Brandenburg.214 As discussed in Part II.B
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
See infra text accompanying notes 217–224.
See infra Part IV.C.
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supra, the Court first addressed the issue of true threats in Watts v. United
States. 215 In holding that the defendant’s aggressive statements, directed
towards the President of the United States, did not constitute true threats,
the Court repeatedly emphasized the importance of protecting public debate
and political speech.216 Because many individuals can interpret politically
charged speech as offensive or abusive, the Court reasoned those elements
alone cannot serve as a basis for censorship. 217 To constitute a true threat,
the Court held that the communication “must be distinguished from what is
constitutionally protected speech,” and must do more harm than merely
making individuals uncomfortable. 218
In the case of Elonis v. United States, the defendant’s online
statements exceeded the level of causing mere offense or discomfort, and
should have qualified under Watts as communications that do not enjoy
constitutional protection.219 In Watts, the Court emphasized the context of
the defendant’s statements as a primary basis for their constitutionality. 220
Because the defendant made his threatening statements during a public
debate involving a highly contested political decision, his statements served
an important function in American society and were therefore
constitutional. 221 Elonis’s statements, however, had nothing to do with an
issue of political importance, and were not related to public debate. 222
Instead, Elonis posted graphic material on his social media profile that
instilled fear in those who viewed it.223 Elonis’s lyrics, directed at
schoolchildren, park-goers, his ex-wife, FBI agents, and local police
officers did not contribute to any ongoing public debate, nor did they have

215. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
216. Id. at 707–08.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 707. However, the Court did not announce a clear standard for what types of
speech would qualify as unprotected by the Constitution. Id. at 708. It tailored its holding
narrowly, and argued that the statements at issue in this particular situation did not constitute true
threats. Id.
219. Id. at 707 (holding that communications, including threats to inflict bodily harm voiced
outside the context of a political debate, may qualify as true threats).
220. Id. at 707–08 (reasoning that because the statements occurred at a political debate—a
setting in which individuals often make emotionally charged statements—the context indicated
that the defendant’s statements did not constitute true threats and were merely offensive speech).
221. Id. (holding that because the defendant’s statements were typical of political speech,
which can “often be vituperative, abusive and inexact,” the Court should be conscious of
protecting the defendant’s First Amendment rights because the right to express personal views,
however unpopular, is a constitutionally protected value).
222. See infra Part III.
223. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015). At Elonis’s trial, multiple
individuals testified that they found his posts extremely disturbing and that they were afraid for
their safety after reading them. Id. at 2005–07. Furthermore, Elonis’s wife obtained a Protection
From Abuse order after she became aware of the posts directed at her, which included extensively
detailed scenarios of how Elonis wished her to die. Id. at 2006.
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any social value. 224 The Watts Court stressed the importance of interpreting
statements “with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in
mind.” 225 Because the First Amendment prohibits censoring speech unless
that speech causes harm, the Court should extend protection to public
debates such as in Watts, but should not allow individuals to make
continuous violent and threatening communications toward others.226
The Supreme Court also should have ruled that Elonis’s statements
constituted true threats because they were acts of intimidation.227 In
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a statute may not
criminalize statements or conduct simply because they advocate
traditionally unpopular beliefs.228 To amount to behavior that violates the
First Amendment, the Court found that a person’s acts or statements must
incite violence, or at least render the possibility of violence imminent and
likely to occur. 229 While Elonis’s statements failed to incite any acts of
violence, he did call for abusive action, particularly in the posts directed at
his ex-wife. 230 These posts did not call upon any particular individual to
commit a violent act against Elonis’s ex-wife, but they did cause her to
obtain a Protection From Abuse order, indicating she feared a likely and
imminent attack on her safety. 231 Elonis’s Facebook posts fortunately did
not result in violence, but the level of detail with which he described plans
to kill his wife could certainly have resulted in harm. 232

224. Id. at 2007; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (holding
that the prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence, from the
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that threatened violence will occur”);
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003) (holding communications whose benefits “are
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” may be restricted under the First
Amendment (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382–83)); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN
CYBERSPACE 200 (2014) (explaining that true threats are not constitutionally protected speech
because “low-value speech can be regulated due to [its] propensity to bring about serious harms
and slight contribution to free speech values”).
225. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
226. See id. (holding “[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally
protected speech” and that while public debate often may not be censored, speech that
communicates an intent to commit bodily harm against another qualifies as a true threat).
227. See infra text accompanying note 230.
228. 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam).
229. Id. at 448–49.
230. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005–06 (2015). Elonis provided an
accurate map depicting his wife’s home as a caption to one of his Facebook posts that stated it
would be illegal for him to state that someone should kill his wife with a mortar launcher. Id. The
map included the best location for someone to position his or herself outside the home in order to
have a clear shot into the home. Id.
231. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006; see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (holding that a statute
cannot punish statements that merely advocate for a cause, but may punish statements if they
incite violence that is imminent and likely to occur).
232. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–06; supra note 230 and accompanying text.

1150

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:1127

The Supreme Court has clearly announced that acts of intimidation
may qualify as true threats. 233 Its decisions in cases involving cross
burning, however, indicate that mere use of an offensive symbol does not
amount to intimidation. 234 In Elonis, however, the defendant’s statements
were directed at identifiable individuals and contained detailed descriptions
of violence. 235 They could therefore be distinguished from categories of
behavior such as cross burning that the Court traditionally has held does not
amount to a true threat. 236 The Court struck down statutes criminalizing
cross burning in both R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota and Virginia v.
Black on the grounds that an act itself cannot serve as evidence of a
person’s intent to intimidate.237
However, the Court emphasized that
statements that threaten imminent violence do not enjoy First Amendment
protection. 238 Because Elonis specifically targeted individuals, such as his
ex-wife and the FBI agent who visited him at his home, his statements
amounted to more than a symbol of violence and intimidation.239 Elonis’s
statements had an identifiable impact on their recipients, and the Court
should have understood them as true threats of violence. 240
B. The Court’s Use of Subjective Intent in Virginia v. Black Only
Applies in the Context of the Challenged State Statute, and
Therefore Does Not Apply to 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c)
Prior to its decision in Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court had never
before included an element of subjective intent in its definition of true
threats. 241 However, the Supreme Court’s insertion of a subjective element
for true threats in Virginia v. Black should only be read in context of that
specific, challenged state statute. 242 The Black Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a Virginia state statute banning the burning of crosses
233. See supra Part II.C.
234. See supra Part II.C.
235. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
236. See supra Part II.C.
237. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348
(2003).
238. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
239. 135 S. Ct. at 2005–07; see Megan Chester, Lost in Translation: The Case for the Addition
of a Directness Test in Online True Threat Analysis, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 395, 398 (2015)
(arguing that because social media presents unique difficulties when it comes to understanding
how serious a person’s statements are meant due to the lack of body language and tone of voice,
the Court should consider the directness of the speech through objective evaluation of the
statement’s recipient in order to define it as a true threat).
240. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007. The victims of Elonis’s Facebook posts testified to the
fear that they experienced after viewing Mr. Elonis’s statements. Id.
241. See supra Part II.C.
242. See Black, 538 U.S. at 364 (holding that the statute at issue was unconstitutional because
it contained a provision stating that burning a cross would be prima facie evidence of intimidation,
which criminalized a range of behavior that was too broad).
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“with an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” 243 Unlike
federal statutes that prohibit true threats, such as Section 875(c) under
which Elonis was charged, the challenged state statute in Virginia v. Black
had always included an element of subjective intent.244
Furthermore, the issue that the Black Court faced did not involve
determining the proper standard of intent to apply to the Virginia crossburning statute. 245 Rather, the Court addressed whether the act of burning a
cross could serve as prima facie evidence of the intent to intimidate a group
of persons. 246 Unlike the challenge in Elonis, which focused directly on
whether Section 875(c) required a showing of general or specific intent, the
Virginia v. Black issue involved what level of evidence was required to
establish whether an individual’s cross burning constituted an act of
intimidation.247 Although the Court struck down the statute at issue in
Virginia v. Black, it stressed that a state may restrict speech when the
“benefits . . . [are] clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.” 248 This logic indicates that the Court would not consider every
statute limiting free speech in the context of intimidation as a violation of
the First Amendment, particularly if the speech limited did not serve a
socially valuable interest. 249 Ultimately, the Court rejected the Virginia
statute because it criminalized the act of cross burning in an impermissibly
broad manner. 250 Keeping this context at the forefront, Virginia v. Black
should not be read as requiring an element of subjective intent for true
threats. Instead, its application should be limited to evaluating the scope of
behavior a statute may limit. 251
C. The Court Should Have Announced a Concrete Intent Standard for
18 U.S.C. Section 875(c), Requiring a Combination of the
Reasonable-Recipient and Reasonable-Speaker Tests
As discussed in Part II.D supra, the circuit courts have struggled to
agree on which intent standard properly governs true threats.252 Aside from

243. Id. at 347.
244. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
245. Black, 538 U.S. at 347 (defining the issue as “whether the Commonwealth of Virginia’s
statute banning cross burning with ‘an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons’ violates
the First Amendment” (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–423 (1996))).
246. Id. at 351. The Court granted certiorari to determine whether a jury instruction “that the
burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent”
was unconstitutional. Id. at 350–51.
247. Id. at 362–63.
248. Id. at 358–59 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992)).
249. Id. at 363.
250. Id. at 364.
251. Id.
252. See supra Part II.D.
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Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court’s definition of true threats has
remained silent as to the required element of intent, and prior to Elonis v.
United States, the Court had never evaluated the intent issue.253 Rather than
taking the opportunity to announce the proper mens rea requirement for
issuing a true threat, however, the Elonis Court failed to address the current
circuit split. 254 The Court did acknowledge that Congress failed to
delineate the required mental state for 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c), but it
nonetheless chose not to resolve this statutory ambiguity. 255 Although the
Court rejected a fully objective intent requirement for true threats, it did not
elaborate on a better alternative, and instead left this decision up to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on remand. 256 The hesitance of the
Supreme Court to announce the proper intent requirement under Section
875(c) not only perpetuates the disagreement between the circuit courts, but
it also leaves individuals without a concrete standard under which to ensure
their conduct does not warrant criminal charges.257
The Supreme Court should have adopted a hybrid, reasonable-speaker
and reasonable-recipient intent standard for 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). 258
The hybrid reasonable-speaker and reasonable-recipient test heightens the
scrutiny from an objective standard by requiring juries to consider how the
person issuing the statement and the targeted individual interpreted the
statement. 259 It therefore provides a workable principle under which courts
may assess true threats. 260 Because a purely subjective or purely objective
intent standard would compromise the ultimate goals of the true threat
doctrine—to protect individual free speech while shielding victims from the
harmful consequences of threats—this hybrid standard would help courts to
achieve both aims. 261 A purely objective standard too often results in
censorship to speech that should enjoy the protections of the First

253. See supra Part II.C.
254. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015). The Court stated that no
significant circuit split existed regarding the proper standard of intent for 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and
reasoned that by requiring more than a negligence standard, the courts of appeals would have
sufficient guidance on how to interpret true threats in future cases. Id.
255. Id. at 2008–09.
256. Id. at 2009 (holding that negligence is not sufficient to support a conviction under Section
875(c)).
257. See Scheffey, supra note 2 (arguing that “[a]s a result of the tension created by the circuit
courts conflicting standards for assessing the requisite intent for true threats, it is nearly
impossible for a speaker whose words could easily reach any circuit via the Internet to predict
what speech is protected and what speech is not”).
258. See infra Part IV.C.
259. See Chester, supra note 239, at 407–09 (arguing that a purely objective test that fails to
require any subjective element restricts free speech in violation of the First Amendment; therefore,
there should be some consideration of the speaker’s motives in evaluating true threats).
260. Id.
261. See infra Part II.C.
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Amendment. 262 While a purely subjective intent standard presents too high
of a burden of proof by requiring prosecutors to prove an individual’s actual
motives in issuing potential threats, the reasonable-speaker and reasonablerecipient combination standard provides a perfect balance. 263
1. A Purely Objective Intent Standard Impermissibly Limits the
First Amendment
In analyzing the proper intent standard for 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c),
the Court should have considered the purpose of the true threat doctrine.
The substance of the debate in the circuits over whether to apply a
subjective or objective element of intent primarily concerns how best to
protect individuals from intimidation and fear of bodily harm while
upholding the constitutional protections of free speech. 264 Throughout the
development of the true threat doctrine, the Supreme Court has strongly
emphasized that unpopular and vulgar speech still enjoys First Amendment
protection, and consequently, has set a high standard for determining what
activities qualify as unconstitutional.265 The Court almost always, however,
includes a caveat that states have an interest in banning intimidation and in
curtailing speech that has little-to-no social value. 266 In Elonis v. United
States, the Supreme Court argued that a purely objective intent standard,
which amounts to negligence in the criminal law, does not afford enough
protection to free speech.267 The Court stressed that a purely reasonableperson standard, which would only evaluate how a reasonable person would
interpret a statement, does not adequately address the dual mental state
requirements of criminal law. 268
In the context of Internet threats, many scholars agree that a purely
objective standard criminalizes behavior that actually constitutes
constitutionally protected speech.269 Scholars argue that the unique

262. See infra Part II.C.
263. See infra Part II.C.
264. See generally Scheffey, supra note 2, at 876–77 (arguing that confusion persists among
the circuits over what degree of objectivity or subjectivity must be shown in order to convict for
true threats, and explaining that purely objective standards result in too many convictions, whereas
purely subjective standards often provide too little relief for victims of violent online posts); see
also CITRON, supra note 224, at 201 (explaining that true threats do not enjoy constitutional
protection because they “generate profound fear of physical harm that disrupts victims’ daily
lives” and lead to “extreme emotional disturbance”).
265. See supra Part II.
266. See supra Part III.
267. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (holding that “wrongdoing must be
conscious to be criminal” (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952))).
268. Id. at 2011.
269. See Thomas DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only Approach
to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) in Light of United States v. Jeffries and the Norms of Online Social
Networking, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 1013–14 (2014) (arguing that individuals who engage in
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intersection between publicity and privacy that social media profiles occupy
allows users to communicate more candidly than they might in other
mediums. 270 These scholars typically advocate a more stringent, subjective
intent requirement for true threat statutes because so many individuals
posting on the Internet fail to appreciate how their statements might be
interpreted by those who view them. 271 Furthermore, the semi-public
nature of a statement made over social media makes it difficult to ascertain
the author’s actual intended audience, and can result in unwarranted fear by
those who read statements out of context. 272 These concerns are rooted in
the notion that statutes cannot criminalize innocent behavior, and applying a
loose standard of intent for true threats would result in unwarranted
convictions. 273
Additionally, a purely objective, reasonable-recipient standard poses
the danger that juries will be overly sympathetic to victims. 274 Although
this standard requires jurors to consider statements in light of how a
reasonable person might interpret them, juries often hear direct testimony
from victims of the statements. 275 By listening to how the statements have
negatively affected these victims, jurors can be swayed by sympathy,
making it harder to analyze the situation from the viewpoint of an
objectively reasonable person. 276 Furthermore, in cases that involve
communications over social media are less likely to consider their lack of privacy; therefore, a
purely objective standard punishes behavior that, while irresponsible, does not rise to a criminal
level).
270. Id. at 1010 (stating that “[s]tudies show that even when an Internet user is not anonymous
and knows the recipient of his communicated message, the speaker is more likely to be
disinhibited when engaged in computer-mediated communication than in other types of
communications”).
271. See Chester, supra note 239, at 407–08. Chester argues that applying an intent standard
that fails to take into consideration the speaker’s intent may restrict free speech because individual
posters often don’t appreciate that their online profiles might be widely viewable. Additionally,
many “status” updates are not intended to be directed at one particular person on the Internet, and
therefore, without considering the intent of the Facebook user, and only relying on how an
objective person might interpret a generalized statement, a person’s innocent speech could be
mistakenly criminalized. Id.
272. See DeBauche, supra note 269, at 984 (arguing that adopting a reasonable recipient intent
standard for online communications puts First Amendment rights at risk because individuals
viewing posts might not be able to understand the context or perspective of the person posting,
and, therefore, the posts can too easily be interpreted as threats).
273. See United States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 426–27 (holding that statutes cannot be read
as criminalizing innocent behavior and when they are, courts should require a higher standard of
intent).
274. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding a reasonablespeaker test “better avoids the perils that inhere in the ‘reasonable-recipient standard,’ namely that
the jury will consider the unique sensitivity of the recipient”).
275. See e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015). The government called as
a witness at least one member of each group that Elonis was charged with directing threats toward
in the original indictment. Id.
276. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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particularly sensitive recipients, a juror may be more inclined to convict a
defendant based on the emotional reaction of the victim, rather than on the
objective evaluation of the statement itself.277 For these reasons, many
courts and scholars advocate applying a higher level of scrutiny to the
required intent of a true threat.278
2. A Purely Subjective Intent Standard for True Threats Fails to
Adequately Protect Victims of Violent Communications
While protecting an individual’s ability to post his or her opinions and
express his or her personal views online should certainly be a priority for
courts and for Congress, applying a purely subjective intent standard raises
concerns that true threats would be too hard to prove in the context of social
media. 279 In United States v. Fulmer, 280 the court rejected the defendant’s
claim that true threats require a showing of subjective intent and held that
“there is no way to directly scrutinize the works of someone else’s mind or
his state of mind.” 281 Requiring a prosecutor to show, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a defendant clearly intended to instill the fear of bodily harm in
the targets of Facebook posts or other Internet communications provides too
high a protection for online posters whose statements cause substantial
psychological harm to those who read them. 282
3. A Hybrid Reasonable-Speaker and Reasonable-Recipient Intent
Standard Protects Both an Individual’s First Amendment Rights
and the Potential Victims of True Threats
In order to strike a balance between the overly broad objectiverecipient standard, which risks criminalizing innocent behavior, and the
extremely difficult-to-prove subjective intent standard, courts should
instead apply a hybrid, reasonable-recipient and reasonable-speaker test. 283

277. See Scheffey, supra note 2, at 883 (explaining the flaws in a reasonable-recipient
standard because juries process information based on the demeanor of the victim on the stand and
the test “fails to weed out overly sensitive recipients or jurors”).
278. Id.
279. See Chester, supra note 239, at 409 (arguing that purely subjective intent standards may
afford greater protections to free speech but still result in difficulties for just prosecution because
no concrete test to determine what a person truly thought at the time he or she issued an Internet
post exists).
280. 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997).
281. Id. at 1494.
282. See CITRON, supra note 224, at 212–18 (discussing the severe consequences victims of
online threats endure, including fear, psychological harm, and emotional distress, and highlighting
that the First Amendment does not protect true threats that cause these damaging mental
responses).
283. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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The reasonable-speaker test evaluates intent based on whether a person
“should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered would be
taken as a threat by those to whom it is made.”284 Adding an element of
intent from the perspective of the speaker raises the level of scrutiny above
a fully objective intent standard, and therefore may prevent innocent
speakers from facing criminal charges.285
Combining the reasonable-speaker test with the reasonable-recipient
test also protects First Amendment rights because it ensures that a jury will
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that both the speaker and the recipient
would interpret the statement as a threat.286 This intent standard helps to
protect the rights of both parties involved. 287 Individuals posting offensive
or violent statements would be adequately protected because, in order to
constitute a true threat, a jury would have to find that both a reasonable
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted as a threat,
and that a reasonable recipient would interpret it as a threat.288 Adding this
extra element of protection helps to ensure that individuals do not face
punishment for voicing unpopular opinions. 289 This hybrid intent standard
also protects potential victims of true threats because the burden of proof is
not as high as it would be under a purely subjective standard. 290 By
combining both the reasonable-speaker and reasonable-recipient tests to
create a dual intent standard, the Court would serve both the victims’
interest in protecting against threats and the First Amendment rights of the
speaker. 291
In Elonis v. United States, the Court should have explicitly adopted
this combination standard of intent. This adoption would have resolved the
circuit split and provided clarity to the modern true threat doctrine.292
Instead, the Court emphasized that the reasonable-recipient standard
employed by the Third Circuit in United States v. Elonis constituted an
284. Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491.
285. Id. (arguing for a reasonable-speaker test and against a reasonable-recipient test because
“a defendant may be convicted for making an ambiguous statement that the recipient may find
threatening because of events not within the knowledge of the defendant”).
286. See supra Part IV.C.
287. See supra Part IV.C.
288. See supra Part IV.C.
289. See CITRON, supra note 224, at 199 (explaining “[a] bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment is that government cannot censor the expression of an idea because society finds
the idea itself offensive or distasteful”); see also Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491 (holding that a
reasonable-recipient standard does not adequately protect the First Amendment rights of speakers
because it results in convictions based on jury members’ sympathies for victims rather than on
factual context of alleged threats).
290. See Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1494 (arguing that a purely subjective intent standard results in
an extremely difficult burden of proof for the prosecution because it is nearly impossible to prove
what another person was thinking).
291. See text accompanying note 288.
292. See supra Part IV.C.
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impermissibly lenient intent requirement. 293 The Court reasoned that only
evaluating Elonis’s Facebook posts from the perspective of his ex-wife, his
co-workers, the local police departments, and the FBI agents who
investigated him—without considering Elonis’s motives in issuing the
statements—resulted in a conviction that could not stand. 294 The recipients
of Elonis’s communications clearly interpreted the posts as threats, and
suffered from fear and psychological distress as a result of viewing them. 295
The reactions of those who Elonis targeted in his posts should not have
been ignored by the Court. 296 Instead, the Court should have also
considered Elonis’s statements from the perspective of a reasonable
speaker. Elonis’s statements contained extremely violent descriptions
targeted at identifiable individuals.297 Due to the graphic language used by
Elonis and the specificity of his posts, a reasonable person should have
known that these statements would be interpreted by those who viewed
them as credible threats. 298 Both a reasonable-speaker and a reasonablerecipient would have understood Elonis’s communications as true threats.
Because this hybrid test serves the dual interests of the true threat doctrine,
the Court should have adopted this intent standard and upheld Elonis’s
conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c).
V. CONCLUSION
In Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court erred by failing to
announce a concrete intent requirement to 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). 299
Because Supreme Court precedent on the true threat doctrine never
explicitly decided the issue of intent for true threats, the circuits have split
on which standard to apply. 300 This circuit split not only results in
inconsistent decisions within the courts; it also leads to ambiguity for
individuals trying to determine what forms of communication are truly
protected by the First Amendment. 301 While the Court was correct in
rejecting a purely objective intent standard and choosing not to adopt a fully
subjective intent requirement, it should have held that Elonis’s statements
qualified as true threats. Had the Court adopted a hybrid reasonablespeaker and reasonable-recipient test for intent, it would have resolved the
293. See supra Part III.
294. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015).
295. See supra Part IV.A.
296. See supra Part IV.A.
297. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
298. See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that including
an element of intent based on the perspective of a reasonable speaker allows a jury to “tak[e] into
account the factual context in which the statement was made”).
299. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
300. See supra Part II.C.
301. See supra Part IV.

1158

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:1127

circuit split and solidified a standard that both protects the right to free
speech and simultaneously allows victims of true threats to receive justice
against those who instilled in them fear, intimidation, and emotional
distress. 302

302. See supra Part IV.C.

